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Results and policy implicationsAbstract
The monetary integration of the acceding countries will proceed in
several distinct steps, starting with membership in the European Union
(EU), followed by participation in the so-called Exchange Rate Mechanism
(ERM) II and ultimately entry into the euro area. This paper addresses
the question of whether a reduction of public de￿cits, such as imposed by
the Maastricht ￿scal criteria, is a necessary or useful step on the road to
the adoption of the euro.
The question is addressed by examining the interaction of monetary,
￿scal and wage policies and their e⁄ects on prices in a monetary union hit
by economic shocks. The theoretical model shows that ￿scal activism is
related with both entry in monetary union and with structural di⁄erences
in the national labour markets, and analyses in detail the e⁄ect of both
factors. As for acceding countries, the conclusion is that the process of
de￿cit reduction should be completed before entry, as suggested by the
Maastricht criteria. The chapter also suggests that ￿scal constraints on
government de￿cits appear essential in a monetary union when the wage
formation is taken into due consideration.
Keywords: Fiscal policy, monetary policy, European Monetary Union,
￿scal rules.
JEL Classi￿cation Numbers: E61, E62, H30
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July 2006Non-technical summary 
 
In this paper I ask the question of whether a country aiming at adopting the euro 
should reduce public deficits before entry, as imposed by the Maastricht fiscal criteria. 
I argue that the conditions of deficit below 3%  already before entry is an useful one, 
because countries which enter the EMU but did not converge to low levels o deficits 
will have more difficulties to achieve this convergence afterwards. 
 
The point is illustrated by examining the interaction of monetary, fiscal and wage 
policies and their effects on prices in a monetary union hit by economic shocks. The 
model shows that entry in a monetary union leads to increased fiscal activism: a 
country with high deficits at the moment of entry in the EMU is unlikely to have a 
sufficient incentive to reduce them later. 
 
In this framework, fiscal criteria have two distinct functions. Before entry, they can be 
seen as a signal that the fiscal authority of the acceding country has internalized the 
correct degree of fiscal discipline necessary to stay in the EMU. After entry, 
constraints on the national fiscal budgets counteract the increased propensity to the 
use of fiscal policy and limit the externalities on the common monetary policy. 
 
The model of the paper is developed as a game in order to take into account the 
structural break of EMU and to provide an analytical framework for assessing the 
potential causes for asymmetry in a monetary union. However, this choice has two 
main limitations: first, the close form solution is obtained in a simplified framework; 
second, the phenomenon is examined in isolation, thereby providing insights about 
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July 20061 Introduction
The monetary integration of the acceding countries will proceed in several dis-
tinct steps, starting with membership in the European Union (EU), followed
by participation in the so-called Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) II and ulti-
mately entry into the euro area.
Already the ￿rst step, accession, implies full acceptance of the actual and
potential rights and obligations that constitute the third stage of EMU, as well
as its institutional framework. The new member states will have to consider
their economic policies as a matter of common concern, avoid excessive govern-
ment de￿cits and adhere to the relevant provisions of the Stability and Growth
Pact. The new member states will have to be committed to the medium-term
budgetary objective of close-to-balance or in surplus positions and to meeting
the objectives of their convergence programmes. Their budgetary policy and
outcomes will become subject to the Excessive De￿cit Procedure and to the
non-sanctioning parts of the Stability and Growth Pact. As far as ￿scal policies
are concerned, and at the time of writing, these commitments imply that further
progress needs to be made in a number of countries before they can apply to
enter the euro area.
This paper addresses precisely the question of whether a reduction of public
de￿cits, such as imposed by the Maastricht ￿scal criteria, is a necessary or useful
step on the road to the adoption of the euro.
Some authors favour a rapid enlargement process of the euro area and ar-
gue that the Maastricht convergence criteria are not necessary and should be
6
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that ￿scal consolidation is equally painful before and after entry in monetary
union, and the decision on whether to consolidate before or wait until the entry
can then be left to each country. Others believe that after entry it will be more
di¢ cult to keep public ￿nances under control. Such an eventuality would be
particularly dangerous inside a monetary union, where the in￿ ation caused by
loose public ￿nances implies an appreciation of the real exchange rate, and a
loss of competitiveness. This second group argues against the adoption of the
euro by countries that have not previously reached a high level of sustainable
￿scal convergence.
The paper examines the interaction of monetary, ￿scal and wage policies and
their e⁄ects on prices in a monetary union hit by economic shocks under the
hypothesis that ￿scal policy has an e⁄ect on aggregate demand. It examines
what is considered to be the most interesting case, when governments have
some de￿cit bias. The theoretical model shows that the use of discretionary
countercyclical ￿scal policy is increased by both entry in monetary union and
structural di⁄erences in the national labour markets, and analyses in detail
the e⁄ect of both factors. As for acceding countries, the conclusion is that
the process of de￿cit reduction should be completed before entry, as suggested
by the Maastricht criteria. The study also suggests that ￿scal constraints on
government de￿cits appear essential in a monetary union when wage formation
is taken into due consideration. Finally, it is shown that di⁄erent structures
of national labour markets make monetary policy more di¢ cult in a monetary
7
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union than in the one-country case.More speci￿cally, this paper argues that :
￿ First and most important, entry in a monetary union leads to increased
￿scal activism . This conclusion does not depend on any switch in pref-
erences, and should be considered as an inevitable fact for any country
joining a monetary union.
￿ The capacity of the central bank to keep in￿ ation close to targets without
continuous interventions is much smaller in a monetary union than in the
one country case. The most conservative central bank can reduce, but
not eliminate, this problem. Therefore, a process of previous reduction of
public de￿cits and in￿ ationary pressures by new members also facilitates
a monetary policy oriented to price stability.
￿ The e⁄ects of the common monetary policy are in￿ uenced by the structure
of the national wage-setting process. As in Calmfors and Dri¢ l (1988),
decentralized wage bargaining produces higher wage in￿ ation and unem-
ployment in a country. Mechanisms to eliminate the externalities in the
wage setting process could be bene￿cial.
￿ In a monetary union, constraints on the national ￿scal budgets are e⁄ective
in re-establishing monetary dominance. They also ensure an ex-post policy
mix of stability-oriented monetary policy, sustainable ￿scal policies and
moderate wage in￿ ation.
￿ From the methodological point of view, the paper takes into account the
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structural break of EMU and provides an analytical and conceptual frame-
work for assessing the potential causes for asymmetry in a monetary union.The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents and describes in
detail the model. The solution of the game between ￿scal, monetary and wage-
setting authorities is provided in Section 3, both with explicit expectations and
with backward induction. Section 4 presents the main results and deals with the
policy implications of the model. Finally, Section 5 summarizes the ￿ndings.
2 The model
2.1 Description of the model
The illustrative model is a simple linear-quadratic, one-shot game. My choice
of a game theory model is motivated by the relevance of the Lucas critique in
the context of the paper. One important implication of the Lucas critique is
that any structural change in a part of an economic system also changes the
behaviour of all other agents. In the case of a monetary union, the transfer
of monetary policy to a supra-national level implies that one cannot expect
the unions and the government to behave in the same way as before, even if
their preferences remain exactly the same. I consider a Barro-Gordon type of
model and concentrate on a country belonging to a monetary union. The basic
hypotheses of the model are described here.
I assume some structural parameters of labour markets as given, because
there are no signs of a very rapid change of the national labour market as
9
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market.
The model focuses on stabilization of the cycle, not on systematic biases.
Therefore, I assume that the long-run targets are agreed among the di⁄erent
players and that tastes di⁄er on stabilization only. Even under this optimistic
scenario the dynamics are quite rich, and several problems arise.
The central bank of a monetary union reacts to union-wide economic in-
dicators, and its actions may propagate shocks to one country to the others.
Similarly, ￿scal policy has spillovers on neighbouring countries. I am neglecting
both monetary and ￿scal externalities in order to allow a simple treatment of
the strategic interaction of the players. For a paper taking into account the
￿ Domino e⁄ect￿of ￿scal policies caused by monetary externalities, see Onorante
(2004).
In the model, both workers￿unions and ￿scal authorities have a larger pref-
erence for output stabilization than the central bank. I believe this hypothesis
is justi￿ed in Europe by the statute of the ECB. To ensure a simpler model I
assume that the governments have totally delegated the objective of in￿ ation
stabilization to the central bank. This parametrization is not restrictive, as its
relaxation does not alter the qualitative results of the model.
Finally, and purely for explanatory purposes, the paper uses a reduced-form
description of the economies and explores the case which is most perceived to
be problematic: an asymmetric shock to output that cannot be dealt with by
the common monetary policy.
10
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central bank is interested in union-wide in￿ ation ~ p and (possibly) output ~ y, both




LCB = (~ p2 + ￿~ y2) (1)
The parameter ￿ expresses the relative aversion of the central bank to in￿ a-
tion and unemployment.
The central bank chooses a union-wide policy variable ~ r, such as a nominal
interest rate, after observing the deviations from targets of in￿ ation and output
of the whole union. Variables with a tilde denote union-wide aggregates. A
union-wide variable is de￿ned as the weighted sum of the corresponding national
variables with the weights ￿ denoting the size of each country in the monetary
union: ~ x = ￿i￿ixi;f￿i : ￿i￿i = 1g
The national ￿scal policy is decided by the government, seeking to mini-
mize a loss function including national (without tilde) output y and de￿cit g;
bothe expressed in deviations from targets1:
min
g LG = (y2 + ￿g2) (2)
conditional to the observed shocks and wage policies, and backward induct-
ing on the central bank. The parameter ￿ expresses the relative preference for
de￿cit stabilization. The target variable p is not included because the goal of
11
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explicitly model only one country, with weight ￿ in the monetary union.
The national wages are determined as the outcome of a decentralized bar-
gaining process. For tractability, I suppose that in the country there are 1= 
identical unions, each of them representing a fraction   of workers. Each union
j = 1;2;::1=  minimizes a loss function of the form
min
wj
LUj = (y2 + ! (wj ￿ p)
2) (3)
including deviations from target unemployment y and real wage in￿ ation (wj￿p)
of the workers it represents. The collective outcome (symmetric Nash equilib-
rium) of the decentralized wage negotiation is the level of wages w in the country:
w = ￿j jwj (4)
= wj 8j
The national macro variables (in￿ ation and output) are linearly related
to the output shock (￿), the growth rate of wages (w) and the policy instruments
(g; ~ r). Expectations are set in advance, therefore the aggregate supply curve is
upward sloping. As a consequence, monetary, ￿scal, and wage policies a⁄ect
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p = g ￿ ~ r + ￿w
where ~ r is the union-wide interest rate chosen by the central bank, g is the
￿scal policy stance of the national government, w is the national wage level, ￿
an observable shock to output2 and ￿ < 1 is a structural parameter describing
the e⁄ect of wage in￿ ation on price in￿ ation. The Appendix shows that the
equations are compatible with a standard AS-AD model.
The assumption that ￿scal and monetary policy are perfect substitutes fol-
lows Nordhaus (1994). The assumption is obviously a simpli￿cation and ignores
relevant second-order e⁄ects such as the di⁄erent e⁄ect that ￿scal and monetary
policy have on interest rates, exchange rates, and sectoral prices. However, I
have shown in Onorante (2003) that a more general setup would not change the
qualitative conclusions.
The order of the moves has been chosen in a way that most re￿ ects the
actual setup of EMU. In a game between unions, ￿scal and monetary authorities,
the participants come to some understanding of the strategy of the others. As a
consequence, at each step of the game the players will take as given the preceding
decisions and form expectations (backward induct) on the following ones. I will
then discard the simplest case, the Nash equilibrium, in which each authority
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￿rst, the workers￿unions determine (each of them playing Nash to the others)
the national wage level w, then the national ￿scal policy g is decided, ￿nally
the central bank observes the union-wide aggregates and chooses ~ r accordingly.
The choice of letting the central bank move last is quite common in the
literature, and easy to justify.3 First, in most monetary unions monetary policy
makers have a coherent and understandable strategy that explicitly depends
on macro variables, while ￿scal policy tends to be more erratic and depend
on elections, personalities and coalitions, but hardly on moral suasion by the
central bank. Also, monetary policy is fast in reacting to external changes in the
economy, including changes in the ￿scal stance of member states, while ￿scal
policy is the result of a long process of negotiation by policy makers and hardly
quali￿es as a variable that the central bank can directly in￿ uence in the short
run.
The choice of letting the unions play before the ￿scal authority comes from
similar considerations: ￿rst, there may be (and normally there are) many unions
in a country, and their reactions are therefore more di¢ cult to anticipate than
those of the ￿scal policy. Second, wages are normally determined for many
years and the contracting process is much more dispersed and slower than the
one leading to ￿scal policy.
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3.1 The role of expectations
The central bank reacts to the e⁄ect on union-wide variables. In case of an
asymmetric shock in a country with weight ￿ 2 (0;1] the aggregate variables
react as:
~ y = ￿(g ￿ ￿w ￿ ￿) ￿ ~ r (6)
~ p = ￿(g + ￿w) ￿ ~ r
Solving the central bank￿ s minimization problem gives the following expres-
sion for r:
~ r = ￿(g + ￿1￿w ￿ ￿2￿) (7)
with ￿1 =
(1￿￿)
1+￿ ; ￿2 =
￿
1+￿. The interest rate is decreased in the event of a
negative output shock unless the central bank is a pure in￿ ation targeter (￿ = 0)
and it is always increased in response of a ￿scal expansion. The response to an
increase in the wage level is theoretically ambiguous, but positive for normal
values of the parameters (￿ < 1), that is unless the central bank cares more
about output than about prices. Finally, the reaction of the central bank is
proportional to the size of the country in the monetary union.
15
ECB
Working Paper Series No 664
July 2006y = g ￿ ~ re ￿ ￿w ￿ ￿ (8)
p = g ￿ ~ re + ￿w




(~ re + ￿w + ￿) (9)
The ￿scal authority faces a cost in changing the ￿scal stance. Hence, the
multiplicator outside the parentheses is less than one, and decreasing in ￿; the
parameter that indicates the cost of discretionary ￿scal policy moves. The ￿scal
policy stance is eased if a negative shock hits the economy, in order to compen-
sate for the additional unemployment coming from an excessive wage in￿ ation,
or to smooth the domestic real e⁄ects of an expected monetary tightening.
Finally, wages are set by unions playing Nash with each other. The Nash
equilibrium describes the solution under no cooperation: each union in the
country plays as if the other unions had decided their wages already. As a
consequence, the e⁄ects of a wage increase on macroeconomic variables perceived
by the average union are given by ￿ : the smaller the size   of the union, the
less the e⁄ect of a wage increase on prices and unemployment will be taken into
consideration.
y = (ge ￿ ~ re) ￿ ￿ w ￿ ￿ (10)
p = (ge ￿ ~ re) + ￿ w
16
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The national government targets the national aggregatesthe resulting wage in￿ ation is
w =
(! ￿ !￿  + ￿ )(ge ￿ ~ re) ￿ ￿ ￿
(￿  ￿ 1)
2 ! + (￿ )
2 (11)
3.2 Results with backward induction
This section shows the solution of the model when expectations are formed by
backward induction. The central bank moves last, after observing the moves of
all the other players:
~ r = ￿(~ g + ￿1￿ ~ w ￿ ￿2~ ￿) (12)
For all possible values of ￿ (excluding 1) the federal central bank lowers
interest rates in response to a negative shock and increases them in response to
wage in￿ ation and public de￿cit. The size of the intervention is proportional to
￿.
The government observes ￿ and w and backward inducts on the ECB. Sub-
stituting (12) into the expectations of (9) one obtains the expression for ￿scal
policy:
g = (1 ￿ ￿)




For all possible values of ￿ (excluding 1) the backward-inducting government
eases the ￿scal stance in response to both a negative shock and an increase in
nominal wages. In the one country case (￿ = 1) the central bank was able
17
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setters; in a monetary union part of this power is lost.
The unions backward induct on both the central bank and the government,




1 ￿ 2￿ + ￿￿2￿ + ￿
2￿
!B + (￿￿￿2￿ + ￿)A
￿
(1 ￿ ￿)
2 + ￿ + ￿ 
￿
￿ (￿￿1 ￿ 1) ￿ 2(￿ ￿ 1)
2
￿￿

















Equations (12, 13 and 14) constitute the complete solution of the model
with backward induction. In order to provide better insights into the economic
implications of this model, the next section highlights some speci￿c issues.
4 Results and policy implications
4.1 Entering monetary union
Before entering monetary union, the country can be thought of as belonging to
a monetary union with itself only. The outcomes are thus described by (14) and
18
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(13) under the assumption that ￿ = 1:w =
(1 + ￿  (￿1 ￿ 1))￿2! + (￿2 ￿ 1)￿  (1 + ￿1)
(1 + ￿  (￿1 ￿ 1))
2 ! + (￿ )
2 (1 + ￿1)
2 ￿ (15)
g = 0
~ p = (1 ￿ ￿1)￿w + ￿2￿
Comparing the previous equations with (13), one can immediately see that the
structure of policy interaction di⁄ers fundamentally. Before entering the mone-
tary union, the national central bank is always able to ￿ discipline￿￿scal policy
according to its own preferences (in this case, g = 0)4. An even stronger result
holds: if the national central bank is a pure in￿ ation targeter, both government
and wage setters have to adapt their policies in such a way that the in￿ ation
target is attained. This result follows from equations (15), where ￿ = 0 (pure
in￿ ation targeting) implies ￿1 = 1, ￿2 = 0: Substituting into the third equation,
one obtains ~ p = 0: Neither result holds after entrance in the monetary union,
and both ￿scal and monetary targets are missed after a shock.
One can conclude that, despite the agreement of the long-run targets between
the di⁄erent authorities, the statement of Dixit and Lambertini (2001, 2003)
that ￿ ￿scal discretion destroys monetary commitment￿is con￿rmed even in the
short-run perspective of this paper. The incentives to the active use of ￿scal
policy increase in a monetary union, where every individual country is tempted
to take advantage of the common monetary policy by running de￿cits with
much of the costs in terms of higher interest rates a⁄ecting the other member
countries5. The new element is that the wage setters internalize the new ￿scal
19
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similar way, further increasing the incentives to the use of discretional ￿scal
policy.
4.2 Size of the country and structural di⁄erences
The complexity and non-linearity of the expressions for the variance of ￿scal
policy and prices make the close-form solution (12, 13, 14) cumbersome. Thus,
I prefer a graphical representation. Figure 1 illustrates the size of the average
￿scal expansion after a negative output shock for all values of ￿ and  : The
other parameters have been chosen in order to illustrate the results, di⁄erent
values have been tried and they do not change the qualitative conclusions. The
colour of the surface depends on the value of the data point, and two lighter
bands have been imposed at ￿ = 1 and ￿ = 0:1 to highlight respectively the
one-country case and the average-sized member of a monetary union.
20
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The results for the one-country case (equation 15) are con￿rmed by the
simulation: for every level of centralization of wage bargaining, the central bank
is able to fully control the ￿scal policy, and the variability is then zero. When
the country enters the monetary union (lighter band at ￿ = 0:1) this e⁄ect of
discipline is maintained only if wage bargaining is centralized (  = 1) so that
wage setters internalize the e⁄ect on prices of higher wages. The more wages
are determined by decentralized bargaining, the more ￿scal policy o⁄sets the
unemployment that arises as externality.
21
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The results on price variability are consistent with the previous ￿ndings. In
the one-country case, the variance of prices is extremely limited (Figure 2; see
again the ￿ = 1 lighter stripe). In a monetary union, prices are driven by two
di⁄erent forces: on the one hand, ￿scal policy takes advantage of the reduced
capacity of the central bank to respond, and this increases prices. On the other
hand, a centralized wage setting is able to limit the in￿ ation of wages (and
thus prices) accordingly, while this is not true of decentralized bargaining. The
interaction of these two forces produces the u-shaped stripe at ￿ = 0:1. The
variance is minimal when the two forces o⁄set each other, maximal if wages are
reduced (one union,   = 1) or if ￿scal policy is expanded in order to preserve
employment after a high wage increase (  = 0).
A general conclusion could be that the federal central bank of a monetary
union has more problems in controlling in￿ ation than a national central bank.
The possibility of free riding by the national governments and the incapacity of
22
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ventions less e¢ cient and increases the variability of in￿ ation.
4.3 The e⁄ect of ￿scal constraints
In Europe, the consideration that a monetary union may multiply the e⁄ects
of any de￿cit bias led to the establishment of the ￿scal criteria in the Stability
and Growth Pact. The budgetary rules aim at tying the governments￿hands
and insulating central banks from possible pressures arising from undisciplined
members of the union. The Pact states that the ratio of the annual govern-
ment de￿cit to gross domestic product (GDP) must not exceed 3%. When the
threshold is reached, expanding ￿scal policy will not be possible. Without loss
of generality, and in order to simplify notation, we set the threshold to zero
(g = 0) in our model.
Are ￿scal constraints really necessary in a monetary union? The answer
provided by Figure 3 shows the ￿nal e⁄ect on in￿ ation of a shock when ￿scal
policy is free to act. the relevant case is when ￿ is small, that is whe the country
is part of a monetary union. It can be seen that in case of a centralized labour
market (  = 1) the shock has a limited impact on prices. However, when   is
smaller the interaction of policies leads to an increase in the ￿nal prices that
further deteriorates the competitive position of the country a⁄ected. At least
in these cases ￿scal constraints would be bene￿cial.
23
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July 2006Figure 3: E⁄ect on prices of a unitary shock
Figure 2 con￿rms that the in￿ ation is more di¢ cult to control in a monetary
union than in the one-country case. The answer seems therefore decidedly
positive.
Are ￿scal criteria really helpful? Consider how ￿scal policy a⁄ects the dy-
namics of wages (with backward induction on the central bank) and ex-post
monetary policy: from (11) and (7) and imposing g = 0 one obtains for every
 ;￿ < 1 that
dr
dg
= ￿ > 0 (16)
dw
dge =
(￿ ￿ 1)(￿! + !￿  ￿ ￿ )
(! ￿ !￿  + ￿ )￿￿1￿ + ￿
2 
2 + (￿  ￿ 1)
2 !
> 0
Equations (16) show the fundamental role played by the constraints to ￿scal
policy in allowing the central bank to control in￿ ation. Removing the ￿scal
bias in￿ uences the ex post monetary policy and disciplines the ex ante wage
24
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policy would respond positively to wage in￿ ation. One should notice that even
though the model has been built on symmetric loss functions for all the players,
the ￿scal constraints become binding only on the in￿ ationary side, and they
never impede budget consolidation when necessary. The result of the ￿scal
constraints is implicit coordination characterized by lower de￿cits, low interest
rates and controlled in￿ ation. Once again there is not an explicit welfare analysis
in this paper, but there is a strong consensus in the literature (for example
Nordhaus, 1994) that an equilibrium of sustainable ￿scal policies and loose
monetary policy is better than a combination of loose ￿scal and tight monetary
policy.
5 Conclusions
The paper develops a model of policy interactions in a monetary union, focusing
on wage dynamics, ￿scal and monetary activism and their consequences on in￿ a-
tion. The simple6 model is capable of grasping and making explicit the strategic
interactions of the di⁄erent policy makers, and shows that lower de￿cits should
be attained before entrance in a monetary union. The following conclusions
emerge:
￿ First and most important, ￿scal activism is always increased by entry
in monetary union. This conclusion does not depend on any switch in
preferences, and should be considered as an inevitable fact for any country
25
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joining a monetary union.￿ The capacity of a central bank to keep in￿ ation close to targets is much
smaller in a monetary union than in the one-country case. Furthermore,
the model shows that the single monetary policy can lead to very di⁄erent
price dynamics in di⁄erent countries of the union. A conservative central
bank can reduce but not eliminate this problem.
￿ The former two points imply that a strategy of convergence in public
￿nances prior to entry in a monetary union may be preferable both for the
acceding country and the stability of the existing monetary union. Entry
in a monetary union should be a decision that the candidate countries
take on the basis of economic fundamentals. For Europe, the Maastricht
de￿cit criterion provides the appropriate incentives to achieve low levels
of public de￿cit before entry in the EMU.
￿ The e⁄ects of the common monetary policy are also in￿ uenced by the
structure of the national wage-setting process. The model shows that
mechanisms to eliminate the externalities in the wage setting process could
be bene￿cial.
￿ Fiscal constraints should remain after entry in the monetary union, as they
are e⁄ective in re-establishing monetary dominance. They also ensure an
ex-post policy mix of stability-oriented monetary policy, sustainable ￿scal
policies and moderate wage in￿ ation.
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tual framework for assessing the potential causes for asymmetry in the
monetary union.
The goal of this paper was not to take into account all possible factors,
but to disentangle a relevant mechanism of interaction among players which is
typical of a monetary union. The conclusions cannot be considered as absolute
statements, as they may not be valid in the context of a di⁄erent modelization.
There are, furthermore, several ways in which the paper could be developed.
First, the analytical framework is extremely simpli￿ed and could be enriched by
adding systematic biases for the national governments and the unions, in order
to obtain results that are valid for the steady state and not only for cyclical
￿ uctuations. Alternatively, the asymmetry in the preferences of the governments
in responding to a positive or a negative shock could be explicitly modeled.
Other relevant phenomena, such as international spillovers, the exchange rate
of the common currency, di⁄erences in tastes between the countries, may a⁄ect
the results in various ways. These are interesting topics for future research.
6 Appendix
Here I show the derivation of from a simple AD-AS framework with some prices
set in advance and rational expectations formed before the shocks are observed.
Demand and supply can be represented as:
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￿ From the methodological point of view, the paper takes into account theyd = ￿p + ￿(g ￿ r) + ed (17)
ys = (p ￿ pe) ￿ ￿w ￿ es
where all the variables are expressed in di⁄erence from targets (m;g;w) or
long-run levels (y;p). The demand and supply shocks are ed and es, ￿ is a
￿xed parameter, which shows that wage in￿ ation is re￿ ected on in￿ ation (with
a parameter ￿ < 1), since wages are only one of the production factors in the
economy.
The reduced form is obtained by solving for the equilibrium (yd = ys), ￿xing
the expectations (pe = 0) and rescaling the equations:
y = ￿(g ￿ r) ￿ ￿w + (ed ￿ es) (18)
p = ￿(g ￿ r) + ￿w + (ed + es)
After renaming the parameters, one obtains the ￿nal equations (5). For
expositional purposes, the shock in the second equation is dropped in the paper.
Notes
1The inclusion of g both as a target variable and instrument is a slight
abuse of notation. A variable which is a goal and an instrument can be better
represented as two variables in a 1 to 1 relationship, in which the instrument
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notation simple. The economic intuition for the inclusion of de￿cit as a goal
is analogous to the popular argument of interest rate smoothing for central
banks: changing drastically the de￿cit level has a cost. The target de￿cit can
be justi￿ed on many grounds. For example, it can be though of as a de￿cit level
which ensures sustainability, as excessive de￿cits lead to accumulation of debt
and possibly to insolvency.
2The case under analysis is a shock to output. For expositional purposes,
the price shock in the second equation is dropped in the chapter (but present
in the appendix).
3This is often referred to in the literature as ￿scal dominance. Monetary
dominance of a single central bank over many ￿scal authorities in a monetary
union is even less realistic than the Nash Equilibrium. In EMU, monetary
dominance is ensured by the SGP.
4The extreme one country stabilization result comes from the fact that the
central bank reacts in such a way to completely o⁄set the ￿scal move, thus
imposing the amount of stabilization given by its own preferences.
5This is a descriptive conclusion, and does not imply a negative judgement.
One could also argue that there is an additional need to stabilize the econ-
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6The model is simple because the agents agree on the long-run targets and
their preferences di⁄er on the degree of stabilization only.References
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